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The Iraqi Brotherhood , represented by the Islamic Party, whose first roots go back to the 1940s, while its actual foundation dates back to the 1960s, could not play a fundamental role in governing Iraq after the fall of the Baath Party regime in 2003 at the hands of the American occupation. This is due to the dominance of the Shiite parties with strong ties to Iran over the reins of the state and its monopoly on the most important executive position in it, which is the position of the Prime Minister, which made the role of the Brotherhood in this experience of government a secondary role complementary and closer to decoration in a formal democracy based on partisan, ethnic and sectarian quotas .
In order to preserve a share in power and the benefits and material and moral privileges it brings, the Iraqi Brotherhood did not find anything but an alliance with the Shiite parties and enter the result in serving the Iranian project, which Tehran relies on those parties for its implementation and is based on expanding and consolidating influence in the country, leading to hegemony over the Iraqi decision. Political, economic and security .
Iranian governments maintain extensive relations with the leaders of the Islamic Party in Iraq, whose visits to Tehran and also their meetings with Iranian officials in Baghdad are not interrupted , similar to the relations between Iran and most of the Iraqi Sunni political leaders. In a report by the Carnegie Middle East Center, Muhannad Salloum, a researcher specializing in Arab and Islamic studies, describes the Iraqi Islamic Party and the face of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, as “a victim of the complexities of the Iraqi Sunni political arena and the dilemmas of working in an environment of exacerbated sectarian and ethnic polarizations ,” adding that he was unable to enhance his popularity nor It is expected to regain an important role in ruling Iraq.
In his research entitled “An Unsuccessful Return: What the Iraqi Islamic Party Given in Return to Power,” he says that the party’s failure to adopt the option of armed resistance against the US- led occupation and its maintenance of good relations with its Shiite and Kurdish counterparts made it easier for it to participate in the governance of Iraq. Its role was secondary to the major Shiite parties. "The party paid a heavy price, even before the great decline in its popularity among the Sunni community in the May 2018 elections, because it failed to fulfill its promises to provide services and security, " Salloum adds.
In fact, the decline of popularity is a common denominator among the religious parties in Iraq, whether Sunni or Shiite, given the disastrous experience of government that they led in the country for 17 years and led to a terrible decline in the state on various political, diplomatic, economic, social and security levels, as these parties formed a machine Huge corruption has impoverished and exhausted society to the point of the explosion that was embodied in the popular uprising that erupted in October 2019 and has not yet been completely extinguished despite the fall of the previous government and the advent of a new government with promises to fight corruption, improve social conditions, extend security and restore state prestige . The search is contained in the Carnegie Center that " the Iraqi public frustrated by the Islamic Party and the Islamic Dawa Party ruling (until 2018) because of their failure ."
In a sign of the declining popularity of the Islamic party among the Sunni circles in Iraq, especially its leaders who are most involved in the failed experience of governance, Salim al-Jubouri, the former deputy secretary-general of the party , was unable to maintain his seat in the parliament resulting from the 2018 elections, after he had headed the previous parliament in One of the darkest stages that the Sunnis of Iraq went through due to the war that took place against ISIS in their areas between the years 2014 and 2017, during which they lost many of their childr en, destroyed their cities and villages, and displaced thousands of them, while the presence of al-Jubouri in that important position had no role in protecting the members of his sect and in mitigating the Their suffering, but was in perfect harmony with the policies underlined by the Shiite parties, including the way the war was conducted and the reliance on waging it mainly on dozens of militias that mistreated The people of the areas occupied by ISIS and considered them in many cases complicit with the organization and embrace it .
Regardless of how the IIP explains its low standing among the Sunnis - Muhannad Salloum adds - the party has already suffered from failing to fulfill promises to protect the Sunni community, provide services, and improve the system of government. His Sunni critics blame him for failing to protect members of the Sunni community during the sectarian violence between 2006 and 2009 after the Al-Askari shrine in Samarra was bombed, where thousands of Sunnis were executed by government-affiliated Shiite militias and the displacement of tens of thousands of people, which led to changes in the demographics. In major provinces such as Baghdad and Diyala .
During that period, the most senior Sunni government official was the Secretary-General of the Iraqi Islamic Party, Tariq Al - Hashemi, who was serving as Vice President of the Republic, before he disagreed with the then Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and became chased on charges of terrorism and was later sentenced to death .
Al-Hashemi sought refuge in Turkey, which allowed him to reside on its lands and refused to hand him over to the authorities of his country, but at the same time it was unable to turn it into a political situation that affects the Iraqi interior, as it does today with Brotherhood members and leaders from several Arab countries residing in Istanbul and fully involved, politically and in the media, in The Turkish intervention project in those countries, but among them there are those who coordinate with Qatari support and financing the Turkish military intervention in some countries .
According to a report by Al-Arab newspaper, the aforementioned factors explain Turkey's lack of interest in the Iraqi Brotherhood and
Sunni leaders in general, its reliance on them in competing with Iranian influence in the country, and its preference for dealing directly with the leading parties of the central government of Baghdad and the local Kurdistan Regional Government run by the Iraqi Kurds in the north of the country. Parallel to that, it is trying to manipulate the card of minorities, relying this time on the ethnic and national factor and not on the religious and sectarian factor, as is the case in using the card of the Muslim Brotherhood in other Arab countries .
It is clear to play the Turkish national worker to try to penetrate the Iraqi arena increasingly in the focus is remarkable by Ankara on Iraq 's Turkmen file who have two advantages not functions that are involved with the other components of Iraqi society . First, the presence of basic strongholds in the same areas of strategic importance to the head of Kirkuk , one of the most valuable "pieces “In the Iraqi map, with its huge oil reserves, the second of which is their fierce competition for the Iraqi Kurds, who in the Turkish perspective remain suspicious because of their independence aspirations, although Ankara is currently dealing with their local government in their region in northern Iraq, especially in the field of oil. Which is exported from Kirkuk and the region via a pipeline that crosses Turkish territory towards the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea .
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