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[size=40]The story of corruption in Iraq[/size]
03 June, 2019
In 2003, when Iraqi political elites from various countries of the region and the world came to govern post-Saddam Iraq, these elites discovered that nothing really connected them to the social norms and institutions of the Iraqi state. These elites have found nothing but the pastoral system in the Iraqi state apparatus to guarantee it for themselves. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi citizens have entered into it, to hold on to state institutions on one side and to secure the loyalty of millions who have been recruited by the political parties of these elites.
In a few years, almost all the Iraqi people have become privatized on the state apparatus. The number of employees and retirees who receive regular salaries from the state treasury has jumped fivefold from 2003, now more than eight million, whose salaries are more than two thirds of the budget Iraqi public. While the last third goes to sovereign budgets, such as military expenses.
Abdul Mahdi's strategy seeks to reorganize the tools that combat corruption
Iraqi officials say Iraq's losses from 2003, due to administrative and financial corruption, amount to hundreds of billions of dollars without a clear definition of real value because of the ramifications of corruption. International figures indicate that Iraq ranked 166th out of 176 countries on the level of transparency in the world. Iraq is one of the most corrupt countries in the world.
What these two articles are trying to explain, this article and the one published last week , is that corruption in the state and public order in Iraq transcends any desire or aspiration to confront it, nor can any program or political strategy do so, for compound reasons, Corruption and its roles and relations with the formation of political forces and the position of Iraq in the regional map and internal conflicts.
Every Iraqi government recovers the same tools, dynamics, and methods as previous governments. These Iraqi governments can only do so. No Iraqi government can achieve any achievements in the fight against corruption. For the first reason, the mechanism of forming Iraqi governments as a functional apparatus is its semi-sole role and its survival is inherent in the extent to which this apparatus is compatible with the central political forces that are fundamentally corrupt. For another reason, the mechanisms that these governments put into the fight against corruption, the mechanisms that, if implemented, will inevitably lead to civil wars, because they really mean the right of a political force by another force.
At the end of January this year, Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi approved the formation of the Supreme Anti-Corruption Council and declared during its first meeting its main tasks: "enabling it to take deterrent measures and unify the efforts of the regulators in the context of new work Capable of confronting any party or person whatever its location, and acting as a state in exposing corruption and protecting society, citizens and public money alike. "
The Iraqi government wanted this council to be the executive body charged with fighting corruption in the country. It includes the executive heads of the central institutions that are usually empowered to fight corruption in the country, such as the Integrity Commission, the Financial Supervision Bureau, the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Office of the Inspector-General. Prime Minister.
The Iraqi government agreed with the Parliament that this Council enjoys all the administrative and legal powers to control the file of corruption. There were three types of actors that objected from the outset, albeit indirectly, to the establishment of this Supreme Council for Combating Corruption.
The central political forces in the government, which believe that this council will be a tool in the hands of the prime minister and the main political currents to control the ability of these small parties to confront the ruling powers through parliamentary corruption files. However, the main political forces did not look at this council favorably, because they feared that it would be an instrument in the hands of the prime minister to pick up these parliamentary powers and bring the corruption file out of the hands of parliament to the government.
The parliamentary political forces, especially the Sunni ones, have also opposed the Supreme Council for Combating Corruption as a tool to withdraw the authority of accountability and follow-up by the Parliamentary Integrity Committee, which they consider the platform and the tool to confront the central political forces. And get it from the corruption of state institutions.
In this sense, the main political forces in the country, while giving the government of Abdul Mahdi the opportunity to create a platform and a new institution to combat corruption, it is very concerned about them, and prepare itself at any moment to withdraw the legitimacy of them. Both from its executive power and its judiciary, represented by Abdul Mahdi's intention to create a special court for corruption in the country.
Abdul Mahdi's strategy seeks to say that the root of corruption in the Iraqi state since 2003 is due to forty major outlets for corruption, which must be focused in the first stage, so that the state can regain its capacity and prestige. Such as oil smuggling, real estate file, border crossings, customs, gold trade and smuggling, prisons and detention centers, official and non-official controls, economic offices in institutions, governorates and ministries, grain and livestock trade, telecommunications network Internet, mobile phones ... etc.
These 40 main sectors are added to many of the corruption files that have been discovered, but the judicial and executive tools and institutions have not been activated. The Iraqi government estimates these files at around 13,000 files of corruption, estimated to be close to one million suspects, corrupt, collaborators, dissidents and disabled by public law. The circle of institutions and departments involved in education and the judiciary, and goes through smuggling and bribes, and does not end the ministries of oil and defense, which are considered one of the most corrupt ministries at all.
The current Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, to do in the file against corruption something similar to what the former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in the security file. Maliki has bypassed all institutions concerned with security and military affairs, such as the Chief of Staff and the Ministry of Defense and the intelligence service, and linking all security files in the Prime Minister's Office.
Current Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi is trying to do something with the anti-corruption bodies, such as the Parliamentary Integrity Commission, the Financial Control Bureau, the Office of the Inspector-General and the Public Prosecution. Abdul-Mahdi does not do that to monopolize the authorities with his hand, as Maliki did, but to his sense that the Iraqi oversight and accountability bodies are disjointed and drowning in the political parties and political leaderships, not what they see as a rigid bureaucratic slack and lazy judiciary. The current prime minister wants to go beyond this by putting all the institutions of the corruption file in his hands, to be effective, when he wants and when he can.
Abdul-Mahdi seeks to do in the file against corruption something similar to what did Nuri al-Maliki in the security file
Abdul-Mahdi's strategy seeks to reorganize anti-corruption tools by transforming the Supreme Anti-Corruption Council into a legitimate central anti-corruption cell that will be guided by all other institutions, even the highest constitutional authority, such as the Parliamentary Integrity Commission. And the enactment of a special anti-corruption court, similar to the Counter-Terrorism Court, which has its own laws, judicial system and exceptional authority that has a wide impact on the rest of the country's legislative, executive and judicial institutions. And the creation of a security and intelligence and police officer takes orders from this court. And that the body is vital, professional and direct, and not subject to partisan and sectarian allocation. To create an initial consensus among the Iraqi political forces, the main ones in particular, to agree on these addresses in principle, to start its work and take the legitimacy of the popular.
This long circle of desires seems to be in prime need for two main things, which have been proven by all the world's experiences: First, they need to secure a space that will legitimize their authority and their share of corruption. In order to do so, it must secure consensus among more than two-thirds of the parliamentarians. . The other is the political will of these forces.
In a more precise and direct sense, Abdul Mahdi must have the absolute mandate of the Iraqi political forces to establish a central authority with supreme authority, to fight them and fight their influence.
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sadly as good as mahdis intentions might be he will never win. m and company are too strong for the weak pm to win and remember curruption is the bread and butter of the politicans using iraq as the cash cow.it is rumored that Sistani wants to remove mahdi because of his weakness ad since abadi left the dawa party he could be waiting in the wings for his old job
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